at least here, the machine is programmed, to automatically stop voting, and count the votes and emmits a report(printed out and eletronically) at exactely 5pm.
aparentely there is some sort of system key to make sure that what the guys brings in to the count room is the same thing that was inside the machine.
now.. people CAN be bought..
so.. as long as humans want money..
someone in a confidence position can screw up..
both the machine, and the printed report must be delivered on the electoral (sp?) building at most at 5:30pm (or was it 6pm ?), so there isn't much time left for the machine to be hacked and the machine auto locks itself after 5pm, so one would have to hack INTO the machine, break the votes encryption, make a fake printed report with the EXACTELY same votes that he hacked into the machine, within the time of 30 minutes.
but, as i said, what if you buy the guy who gets the machines ? then you have like.. more time to hack the thing..
voting can never be safe, because you can't trust people.
> It's easy for an electronic voting machine to print out a vote receipt for a
> manual recount in case of machine failure or hackery. It's not like we don't
> know whether or not the machines can be tampered with and are hackable, it's a
> fact, they can be tampered with and they are quite clearly hackable. It was
> also thought that since the government is a public body, the voting system
> should be public as well, an open project that can be reviewed by any citizen
> who wishes to make sure their vote is dealt with securely by an electronic
> However, the fact that the company repeatedly, refused to divulge details on the
> software (presumably because they wish to quell any distrust of the voting
> software), and during software demonstrations they didn't let anyone touch the
> machines or try various things out. In addition, leaked memos have shown that
> Diebold were using uncertified machines in production, that's machines running
> versions of software that haven't been approved for use (not that that
> certification must do any rigorous testing considering the shape the software is
> in) and who knows what flaws, back doors, or whatever have made their way in
> The fact that receipts aren't mandatory and the fact that they're going ahead
> with these shitty machines with a shitty system to register your vote just shows
> how unseriously the american government is taking this voting procedure and
> almost guarantees problems. How many people are going to try to hack these
> machines on election day? It's going to be nuts.